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Turkey in Somalia: Challenging North/Western interventionism? 
 
Chuck Thiessen, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, UK1 
Alpaslan Özerdem, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, UK 
 
Abstract 
Turkey’s humanitarian and development intervention in Somalia is unusually illuminating as 
a case study to investigate the relations between emerging and conventional interveners in 
conflict zones since, in this case, Turkey’s intervention carries adequate impetus to resist 
assimilation with conventional North/Western counterparts. Our starting point is the 
observation that Turkish and conventional humanitarian and development interveners have 
struggled to coordinate or cooperate in Somalia. This article investigates what this 
uncooperative and uncoordinated organisational behaviour means, and we root our 
investigation in 21 face-to-face interviews with officials working inside the Turkish and 
conventional intervention in Mogadishu and Nairobi to inquire about how they understand and 
theorise this discordant behaviour. We use a parsimonious analytical framework of 
trustworthiness that questions the ‘ability’ and ‘integrity’ of counterpart organisations to 
explore the intentions behind organisational behaviours. Our analysis of interview narratives 
evidences challenges to conventional methods of intervention by Turkish organisations and the 
protection of the same by North/Western organisations. Our concluding discussion interprets 
these findings in relation to consequences for the status quo hierarchy of global governance 
and its promotion of liberal intervention norms, and for the utilisation of securitised and 
remote-control intervention methodologies in conflict zones such as Somalia. 
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Introduction 
We contextualise this article’s analysis with a short vignette:  
(c. 2015) A Turkish NGO aid worker openly working in a field outside Mogadishu 
together with local farmers looks up to see a plane descending into the heavily 
defended Mogadishu International Airport.  The plane carries a United Nations 
official from her headquarters in Nairobi for a 1020 km journey to meet with Somali 
project managers inside a secured airport meeting room before flying back to 
Nairobi. After finishing his work, the Turkish worker drives himself back to his rented 
home where he lives with his spouse and children. 
The contradictory modes of engagement by these two expatriate workers point to the reality 
of divergent approaches to humanitarian and development intervention as practiced by 
Turkish and conventional North/Western organisations in Somalia. 
Since 2011 Turkish organisations have intervened with significant institutional and 
resource weight in Somalia and have effectively introduced innovative approaches to 
humanitarian and development service provision that are outpacing efforts by conventional 
interveners including the UN, North/Western state donors and their governmental and non-
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governmental representatives.1 Our starting point is an observation that the dominant 
conventional international community and emerging Turkish intervention actors are 
struggling to coordinate or cooperate in Somalia.2 While the conventional intervention is 
multi-lateral in nature and is coordinated from Nairobi, the Turkish intervention community 
is based in Mogadishu and has been perceived as isolationist as it circumvents most 
conventional coordination structures, features bilateral aid relationships with Somali 
counterparts, and funds Turkish organisations with Turkish aid money.3 
This article explores how and why conventional and Turkish intervention paths have 
diverged in Somalia. This exploration contributes more broadly to understanding the 
proliferation of non-conventional but influential interveners such as Turkey in conflict zones 
across the globe as a pivotal development for international relations and the status quo of 
global governance.4 However, existing empirical literature has not yet considered how this 
important evolution in international intervention plays out inside intervening organizations 
and, thus, cannot predict what uncooperative and uncoordinated organizational behaviour 
actually means in this case. This paucity of research is sharply out of sync with the rapidly 
expanding roles played by non-conventional interveners inside international interventions in 
conflict zones.5  In response, this article makes two thematic inquiries. First, we inquire 
whether the struggle to coordinate and cooperate indicates the contention of conventional 
methods of intervention by Turkish organisations and, second, whether this struggle also 
indicates the protection of conventional methods by North/Western organisations in the face 
of a perceived challenges by emerging actors.6 
These overarching avenues of inquiry are important and original in the context of 
existing literature, analytical frameworks and methods of research on international 
intervention. A literature review shows that, to date, dissonant relationships between 
conventional and emerging non-conventional humanitarian and development organizations 
have not been explored at the field-level in conflict zones. Analytically, this is the first 
research on humanitarian and development intervention in conflict zones to utilize a 
framework of trustworthiness7 to assess relations inside the international community. More 
specifically, we explore dissonant organizational behaviours by considering perceptions of 
two antecedent factors to trustworthiness - ‘ability’ and ‘integrity’ - to investigate the 
intentions behind organisational behaviours. Utilizing a framework of trustworthiness helped 
us uncover the meanings ascribed to organizational behaviours that, once identified, 
contribute to the scholarly understanding of emerging intervention actors in conflict zones. 
Methodologically, there has not been any substantive scholarly research that approaches 
those closest to the action - 21 officials working for Turkish, UN, US, and EU humanitarian 
and development organisations in Mogadishu and Nairobi - to inquire about how they 
understand and theorise a lack of cooperation and coordination. 
 This introduction section has stated our goal of deciphering the underlying meanings 
ascribed to uncoordinated and uncooperative behaviour by Turkish and conventional 
intervening organizations. We now proceed by outlining our theoretical background before 
we describe our analytical framework of organisational trustworthiness8 and methods. 
Findings are presented next, which feature a discussion of the meanings given to Turkish and 
non-Turkish intervention behaviours. The final discussion and conclusion sections interpret 
these findings in relation to the status quo hierarchy of global governance and its promotion 
of liberal intervention norms, along with consequences for the predominant politics of 
securitised and remote-control intervention methodologies in Somalia and elsewhere. 
Context – International intervention in Somalia 
Turkey has entered a complex conflict zone that is defined by colonial interference, 
splintering clan and regional politics, civil warring, famine and natural disasters, and repeated 
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international and regional military and aid interventions. The severe food crisis across 
Somalia and Somaliland during the 2011 East African drought set the scene for Turkey’s 
foray into the country, launched by the August 2011 visit of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan along with a large entourage of family, politicians, business people, aid organisation 
representatives and celebrities. Erdoğan would also make a strong appeal at the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2011, passionately advocating for famine 
relief for Somalis. Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia foreshadowed the reopening of the Turkish 
Embassy in Mogadishu, the return of attention by many conventional international donors, 
Turkish facilitated peace talks between Somalia and Somaliland, and the intervention of 
numerous Turkish aid and development organisations funded by the Turkish International 
Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) - the Turkish bilateral development agency.9 
The Turkish intervention in Somalia is situated within a wider and more active engagement in 
international affairs by Turkey which has solidified its status as an influential rising power 
intervener.10 The Somalia intervention is emblematic of Turkish notions of ‘humanitarian 
diplomacy’, as strategically proposed by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009-
2014), that emphasized humanitarian aid and development as fundamental components to 
expanding diplomatic ventures and ensuring foreign policy interests across the developing 
world.11 
During the initial push of the intervention, Turkey evolved into the fourth largest aid 
donor globally in 2012, and the largest donor among non-OECD-Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) countries in Somalia. Turkish actors have headquartered their activities in 
Mogadishu and are viewed as somewhat isolationist because of resistance to coordination 
with conventional multi-lateral donors and their reliance on Turkish aid money. Turkish 
organisations work alongside a complex multi-lateral aid environment in Somalia and Kenya 
that features numerous multi-lateral North/Western coordination arrangements. Over 20 
coordination arrangements exist, and are dominated by OECD-DAC member states (e.g. the 
US, EU, UK, Japan, and others) and the UN – especially the UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).12 Multi-lateral complexity in Somalia is exaggerated by 
remote control management of intervention activities – virtually all international embassies, 
donor offices, and NGOs have chosen to be based in the relative safety of Nairobi after the 
withdrawal of US troops in 1994 and UNOSOM in 1995. 
A brief clarification of what we mean by ‘international intervention’ is also necessary. 
Nuancing the ‘international’ by differentiating between conventional North/Western (broadly 
congruent to the OECD-DAC list of countries) and non-conventional Turkish activities is 
essential for the argument of this article. While the bifurcation of these two geographical 
categories imprecisely represents a differentiated set of intervening staff and organisations,13 
our data indicates that representatives of Turkish humanitarian and development 
organisations believe they have travelled an alternative path to/in Somalia compared to 
conventional counterparts. These categories serve our purposes by clarifying distinctions at 
the level of abstraction required to generate broader conclusions in other contexts. We reduce 
the homogenisation of rather different international actors by targeting officials within the 
humanitarian and development sectors who are associated with funding from the UN, EU, 
UK Department for International Development (DFID), United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and TIKA. And last, we have chosen to utilise the 
expansive and ambiguous term ‘intervention’, which refers to the basket of internationally 
sponsored and interconnected activities committed in the name of humanitarianism, 
development and peacebuilding in Somalia. 
Theoretical background 
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Our theoretical background explores the intervention space in which Turkish and 
conventional interveners interact by critically surveying two potential areas of ideological 
contention, before it discusses the expanding roles of Turkey and other non-conventional 
interveners in conflict zones. 
The self-interested normative discourses of North/Western interventionism 
In order to comprehend the intervention milieu in which Turkish and non-Turkish 
organisations interact it is necessary to consider the self-interests of the North/West to 
intervene in the conflict-affected developing world as they side-line the restraints of national 
sovereignty and intervene on humanitarian grounds. The conventional intervention 
community in Somalia is primarily commissioned by democracies in the North/West and is, 
as such, underpinned by liberalism, which is vitally interested in the spread of liberal 
democracy and free-market economics in service to the democratic peace theory. As 
examples, dominant normative powers in global politics such as the EU promote, in 
conjunction with the UN system, the principles of democracy, universal human rights, rule of 
law, equality, freedom, and good governance.14 
But the dissemination of liberal norms and values has not been a self-propelling 
‘hands-off’ venture. Dissemination has required aggressive modes of transmission that 
restrict differences in opinion and target non-liberal populations to expand the liberal 
sphere.15 Aggressive modes of transmission are evident in the profusion of ‘humanitarian 
wars’ in contexts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, and Somalia. In this way, 
‘humanitarian war’, as embodied by the War on Terror, counter-terrorism action, and more 
recently projects to counter violent extremism,16 has evolved into an essential instrument to 
advance the goals of liberal global governance.17  
Expanding the liberal sphere of ‘secure’ space has required liberal governments to 
conceive of humanitarian and development intervention assistance as essentially political in 
nature.18 Politics and aid delivery intersect at multiple points and levels (international, 
regional, local), which has created divisions within the conventional intervention community 
between organisations who insist they are insulated from political interference and those who 
aim to transform the politics and dynamics of local conflict without concern for neutrality.19 
The politicisation of intervention serves the liberal system of global governance since the 
technologies of intervention utilised are calibrated to regulate the behaviours and attitudes of 
‘dangerous’ populations and transform the society, economics and politics therein.20 
Self-interested intervention practices have been legitimated by a belief in the 
universality and moral superiority of Western liberal norms, resembling the colonial mission 
civilisatrice rationale for intervention.21 Conceived thus, the perceived benefits for the 
intervener shape the intervention in fundamental ways - interveners promulgate globalised 
norms and discourses that ultimately strengthen the liberal sphere while reducing opposition 
in periphery conflict zones. For example, North/Western interventionists have curtailed 
accusations of neo-colonialism and imperialism and masked underlying political motivations 
by invoking the human security discourse.22 But the human security discourse needs to be 
problematised 23 - there is growing evidence that the human security discourse along with its 
offspring Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine24 are being employed for far more than 
addressing the insecurity of local conflict-affected populations, and serve the self-interests of 
liberal nations themselves by morally legitimating more direct forms of intervention in 
conflict zones.25 
The human security and R2P discourses also provide liberal interventionists with a 
legitimate framework for setting the conditions and parameters that either embrace or exclude 
non-conventional interveners in conflict zones. This permission to discriminate between who 
can and cannot ‘legitimately’ intervene has required the North/West to retain careful control 
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over international interventions. Control is ensured through incentives – especially donor 
resources, beneficial policies, and access to networks26 – that ensure intervention 
methodologies contribute to enlarging the North/West’s sphere of influence. In response, this 
research asks whether the self-interested normative discourses of liberal interventionism such 
as the human security and R2P discourses are being utilised as points of contention by 
emerging interveners themselves to revise the status quo of global governance. 
The securitisation of intervention and the politics of perceptual and physical remoteness 
The politicisation of humanitarian and development intervention reveals its motivations – 
humanitarian and development activities increasingly serve the international security agenda 
of the North/West.27 By projecting local needs as security issues, external interveners shift 
attention away from the local experience of peace and development towards the self-interests 
of conventional interveners, which is facilitated by an intervention logic of perceptual and 
physical remoteness. 
 Autesserre argues that perceptual remoteness is based upon the valorisation of 
external technical expertise over local knowledge, creating a knowledge hierarchy that 
ultimately serves to segregate interveners from local counterparts and populations.28 As 
interveners allow technical assistance and credentialed knowledge to override traditional 
local knowledge, ‘differential social capacities’ and power differentials are generated.29 
Likewise, a relatively small group of North/Western interveners control emerging interveners 
and their intervention methodologies, which reinforces the boundaries of a certified and 
professional class of interveners who move from crisis to crisis with specialist knowledge and 
‘industry talk’, as differentiated from both local and emerging international counterparts.30 
The securitisation of international intervention has also required physical remoteness, 
which is embodied by pervasive security policies and routines that profoundly configure 
interactions between interveners and their counterparts. Remote practices have been driven 
by perceptions of increased risk for foreign personnel working for agencies that are not 
viewed as impartial by local belligerents.31 Physical remoteness is experienced at multiple 
levels and shapes the daily ‘security’ routines of intervening staff as well as overarching 
intervention structures and processes.32 For example, daily routines such as security briefings, 
curfews, uninterruptable communication infrastructures and protocols, carefully monitored 
and vetted travel plans, and stricter precautions for female expatriate staff are common across 
most conflict zones.33 
Securitisation transform the space in which intervention occurs. Smirl inspects the 
securitised and ‘liminal’ space of intervention – the SUV, luxury hotel, and aid compound – 
and argues that each space enables intervening outsiders to distantiate local populations.34 
Air-conditioned four-by-four SUVs with tinted windows visually and symbolically create 
miniature mobile outposts of security as they rove amongst local populations who are 
restricted to second-class form of transport such as walking, bicycles, crowded public 
vehicles, or animals.35 Similarly, Smirl observes that ‘every conflict has its hotel’, typically 
large fortified luxurious spaces where external interveners can vet local counterparts through 
the approval of meeting invitations.36 
But perhaps the most poignant symbolic expression of North/Western withdrawal and 
physical remoteness is the walled aid compound.37 As powerful metaphors for the securitised 
delineation between ‘internationals’ and the objects of intervention, these separate spaces 
manifest processes of ‘bunkerisation’, or the retreat of interveners away from direct contact 
with local populations and into safe spaces38. Examples include UN and NGO compounds in 
most active conflict zones including Baghdad’s Green Zone, Kabul’s Green Village or even 
situating headquarters in cities in neighbouring countries (e.g. Nairobi for Somalia and 
Amman for Iraq and Syria). This retreat has fostered a ‘fly-in/fly-out’ mind-set, whereby 
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security protocols require foreigners to restrict their travel to between walled compounds and 
residences and, in the case of Somalia, fly into the Mogadishu airport to meet with local 
implementing counterparts onsite. This retreat also transfers both responsibility and risk to 
local implementing partners39 and relies on forms of remote management,40 whereby 
interveners work at arm’s length, relinquish the ability to monitor their zones of influence and 
risk the control of these ‘demonitored spaces’ to alternative (possibly ill-disposed) actors.41 
The challenge of and pushback against emerging interveners in conflict zones 
The current empirical literature scarcely considers whether the promulgation of self-
interested normative discourses and the securitised remoteness of international intervention in 
conflict zones serve as points of contention through which emerging interveners leverage 
change in global governance. Emerging non-conventional interveners are exploiting an 
increasingly permissive international environment and forcing the re-adjustment of 
intervention architecture and manners, which is provoking pushback from OECD-DAC 
member states, their donor arms, and the international implementing partners they support. 
Sezgin and Dijkzeul describe how the spectrum of intervention actors responding to 
humanitarian crises is expanding to include for-profit organisations, private security 
companies, faith groups, diaspora groups and a variety of regional organisations.42 Further, 
new donors that include several Gulf states, China, India and Turkey are asserting themselves 
and operate, along with a variety of private foundations, outside of global aid tracking 
mechanisms and channel funding through host countries as opposed to multi-lateral 
frameworks. 
The stature of emerging state interveners inside current forums of global governance 
is contested in the existing literature. Do these emerging actors simply represent facile 
differences in terms of the practicalities of different intervention approaches or do they 
represent fundamentally non-conventional approaches and model dissonant modalities of 
intervention as a critique of conventional approaches? Call and de Coning argue that Turkey 
and other rising power interveners do carry with them divergent worldviews and theories of 
change compared to conventional donors – focusing heavily on basic socio-economic and 
governance capacities as well as physical infrastructure, often preferring government partners 
to civil society, conceptualizing politics, development, and stability as closely interlinked, 
and being reticent to monitor and evaluate humanitarian and development inputs.43 But in 
terms of actual impact, competing viewpoints exist. Some scholars attribute significant 
agency to emerging state-directed actors in eroding North/Western-approved norms of 
intervention,44 arguing that these actors are committed to reforming the global architecture of 
conventional intervention and are eroding progressive norms of intervention, particularly in 
the area of human rights.45 Competing viewpoints grant little agency to southern emergents 
and propose that despite desires to redistribute power in the global political economy46 
emergents have been tentative and reluctant to assume global leadership roles47 and prefer to 
contest from within and remain integrated into the existing governance order and 
North/Western liberal structures.48 
Either way, there are deep contradictions and ambiguities in the stance of emerging 
state interveners – emerging interveners are often, at once, products of Western colonial 
influence, ‘developing’ countries in their own right,  and acting as development partners to 
less fortunate countries – creating a complex and ambiguous positionality in relation to 
North/Western counterparts and local conflict-affected populations. 49 Emerging state 
interveners such as Turkey strategically utilise their various identities to service their foreign 
policy and economic interests. 
Two factors shape the complex and ambiguous identity of Turkey as an intervener. 
First, Turkey’s interventionism carries the historical baggage of the Ottoman empire, which 
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influences both its relations with the North/West and political discourses inside Turkey 
regarding its foreign policy in Africa, the Middle East and Asia.50  Turkey has positioned and 
nominated itself as an influential geo-political actor and as a meeting place of civilisations. 
This outward-looking foreign policy breaks with Atatürk’s inward-focused ‘Peace at home, 
peace in the world’ approach with a more self-confident stance in the developing world. Self-
confidence has allowed Turkey to challenge its traditional subordination to the global 
governance status quo and increasingly project its self-interests onto the foreign stage.51 
Second, Turkey is most certainly intervening in service to distinct self-interests in 
Africa. Turkish initiatives in Somalia ensure visibility and support the state’s legitimacy 
across the African continent and its geopolitical goals. Economic interests include providing 
a market for Turkish goods and business ventures, ensuring access to Somalia’s untapped 
natural resources, as well as strategically positioning itself to access regional markets in the 
Horn of Africa.52 Turkish interests are backed up by expanding infrastructure – since 2017 it 
has opened its largest military base outside of Turkey near Mogadishu, agreed to open a 
massive Red Sea port in north-eastern Sudan, and been invited to open a military base in 
Djibouti.53 Turkish self-interests shine through its strategic and multi-track ‘humanitarian 
diplomacy’ foreign policy,54 which attempts to balance conscience with national interests by 
providing humanitarian aid in crises to secure power, influence, and prestige. 
It is important to consider the challenge of non-conventional interveners to the 
conventional intervention enterprise. The intervention space is inherently a site of 
contention,55 and emerging configurations of actors shape the intervention space in ways that 
are difficult to predict.56 Uncertainty is compounded by scant research and theorizing 
regarding the push-back by conventional North-Western interveners to the challenge of non-
conventional interveners in these spaces. The very nature of Western liberalism requires its 
international representatives in conflict-affected contexts to make clear who is ‘in’ and ‘out’ 
of the Western enterprise and confront difference to maintain its internal coherence.57 It is 
unclear whether and how conventional actors enforce their dominance and reproduce this 
coherence. This article explores how coordination and cooperation between conventional and 
emerging actors can serve this dominance and coherence as emerging actors are integrated 
into or side-lined from conventional intervention structures.  
Analytical framework and methodology  
This research utilises a single-case study grounded theory design to investigate an unusually 
illuminating case of humanitarian and development intervention. Unlike most cases of 
‘emerging power’ intervention, Turkey has, in this case, entered Somalia with adequate 
impetus to resist assimilation with conventional North/Western actors and determine the 
terms of its engagement with conventional actors. Our research utilises a framework for 
organisational trustworthiness as outlined by the seminal work of Mayer, Davis and 
Schoorman58 to analyse perceptions of underlying intentions behind observable Turkish and 
conventional organisational behaviours. Perceptions of trustworthiness inform decisions by 
one organisation to trust another, and encapsulate a set a beliefs that a trustor holds regarding 
another organisation and their joint relationship.59 Mayer et al. conceive of trust as being 
multi-faceted in nature, and proposed that the theme of trustworthiness can be explored 
indirectly through a set of antecedent factors – including ‘ability’ and ‘integrity’.60 They 
argue that these factors explain a majority portion of the perceived trustworthiness of 
organisations, and provide a ‘parsimonious foundation for the empirical study of trust for 
another party’. Ability refers to ‘that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that 
enable a party to have influence within some specific domain’.61 In other words, does the 
trustee perform as the trustor sees fitting in the situation? Perceptions of integrity also 
indicate trustworthiness and involves the ‘trustor's perception that the trustee adheres to a set 
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of principles that the trustor finds acceptable’.62 Feeding these perceptions of integrity are 
judgements of value and moral congruence, the credibility of the other’s communication, the 
other’s sense of justice and fairness, the alignment of their actions with their words, and 
whether they are perceived to be self-serving in nature.63 
Our data was gathered through a series of 21 face-to-face interviews in 2015 with 
senior or mid-level officials from Turkish, US, and EU government, international NGO, and 
donor humanitarian and development organisations as well as the UN in Mogadishu and 
Nairobi. Sampling was purposive to ensure a cross section of viewpoints were gathered, as 
defined by key inclusion criteria: the location of international headquarters (US, EU, or 
Turkey) and regional coordination offices (Mogadishu or Nairobi), the type of organisation, 
and experience of international cooperation in Somalia. Sampling was also theoretical – some 
participants were approached to elaborate on gaps in the research. Interviews were conducted 
in Turkish or English and most were audio recorded. Data analysis was steered by a hybrid 
constructivist approach to grounded theory64 and identified core explanatory categories 
through open coding, which were clustered under the themes of ‘ability’ and ‘integrity’. 
Subsequent selective coding fleshed out core categories. 
Findings – Perceptions of trustworthiness 
Our findings explore whether the struggle to cooperate and coordinate in Somalia can be 
interpreted as a challenge to conventional ways of intervention by Turkish organisations 
and/or the protection of the same by non-Turkish counterparts. We have divided our findings 
according to perceptions of ability and integrity by both Turkish and North/Western 
respondents, as illustrated in the four quadrants of Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Structure of findings 
 Turkey North/West 
(In)ability 
Turkish perceptions of 
North/Western (in)ability 
North/Western perceptions of 
Turkish (in)ability 
Integrity 
Turkish perceptions of 
North/Western integrity 
North/Western perceptions of 
Turkish integrity 
 
Turkish perceptions of North/Western (in)ability 
We begin with the top-left quadrant of Figure 1. Turkish interview narratives featured the 
perceived inability of counterpart conventional organisations. Several respondents argued that 
non-Turkish intervention action was remote from local populations since headquarters were 
abroad in Nairobi and meetings were often held behind fortified walls at the Mogadishu 
airport. One Turkish government respondent commented on ‘bunkerised’ strategies: ‘The UN 
itself is like a black box. They organise meetings at the airport, they accommodate there. 
They have no contact with the people.’ A Turkish NGO leader used an oppositional lens to 
argue: 
They have a closed structure. It is hard for the local to get in touch with them. We are 
on the streets every day. We never see these organisations in touch with the people. 
Maintaining a distance with people is meaningless. … The problem would be solved 
if they leave their ivory towers and unite with the people. 
Some respondents talked about how conventional projects were inappropriately risk-averse 
and banned international staff from local project sites. As a result, these projects have been 
shaped by the inconveniences of remote and bunkerised approaches to intervention with local 
populations struggling to comprehend implementation processes. Other Turkish respondents 
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critiqued through contrast and believed the proximity of Turkish organizations to local 
populations gave them distinct advantages in local credibility, effectiveness, and acceptance, 
which secured greater protection for projects and personnel. 
Turkish interview narratives also revealed that Western intervention strategies are 
perceived to be inefficient and disoriented. For example, Turkish NGO officials argued that 
UN projects struggle to ensure accountability from a distance, and that project costs are 
massively inflated because of fraudulent local procurement processes. Consequently, 
North/Western credibility has declined, which also affects counterpart Turkish organisations. 
A Turkish donor official stated that his organisation avoided working with Western 
counterparts since association created danger for his staff and blamed the targeting of Turkish 
personnel by Al-Shabaab on previous cooperation with North/Western organizations. 
Another Turkish aid official stated: ‘From a humanitarian perspective, it is out of question for 
us to work with a group which has a dark background.’ He believed that the segregation of 
Turkish initiatives was justified since local populations reacted differently to North/Western 
organisations. 
However, not all comments were critical - Turkish respondents also talked about 
structural abilities, especially the networked nature and internal coherence to conventional 
North/Western strategies and methodologies due to careful multi-lateral coordination. These 
respondents recognised that multi-lateral coherence magnified the scale and reach of the 
conventional intervention, allowing it to extend far beyond the capital Mogadishu through 
regional partnerships and offices across most central government-controlled areas of Somalia. 
North/Western perceptions of Turkish (in)ability 
We now move to the top-right quadrant of Figure 1 - perceptions of Turkish (in)ability. 
North/Western respondents acknowledged that Turkey’s robust humanitarian and 
development intervention including Erdoğan’s symbolic visit and servicing Mogadishu with 
Turkish Airlines flights had effectively legitimated and normalised support for the Somali 
project across the globe. Conventional respondents also respected the timely, direct and 
visible impact intervention approaches of Turkish organisations. A foreign donor official 
surmised, ‘They act quickly, are visible.’ Flexible action is enabled by prioritised resource 
support from the Turkish government (e.g. TIKA) and direct action is facilitated by placing 
Turkish expatriate staff in local areas to interact openly with project recipients. An 
international NGO leader viewed this localised presence as a direct rebuff to conventional 
remote practices and stated, ‘[They] have taken a step closer to the Somalis’. He noted that 
some Turkish workers resided with their families in Mogadishu. Many respondents believed 
highly visible infrastructure projects (e.g. hospitals, schools, mosques, roads, street lighting, 
an orphanage, airport and seaport) enhanced Turkey’s image.  
 But North/Western respondents also shared perceptions of Turkish inability - 
especially Turkish inability to operate according to internationally approved standards when 
delivering aid. A Western donor official asserted: 
Turkish organisations can learn from good ‘donorship’ ideals - these ideals have not 
come from nowhere but are based on established principles from extensive experience 
in a vast number of countries over a long period. 
Further, the Turkish intervention was perceived by some as careless, lacking an overall 
agenda and, worse, damaging and causing unnecessary local conflict by disrupting local 
society, commerce and politics.  
Conventional respondents also found fault with direct Turkish approaches to aid 
delivery, especially a deficiency in local ownership. Direct approaches side-line local Somali 
implementing partners in favour of Turkish NGOs themselves. Relatedly, respondents 
critiqued Turkey’s Mogadishu-centric focus and avoidance of peripheral areas. One 
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respondent believed this centralised approach was ignorant of Somali clan politics wherein 
Mogadishu is not consistently recognised as the State capital. 
 Other critiques focused on Turkey’s international relations and the scope of its global 
and regional influence. Some respondents questioned whether Turkey could effectively 
engage with regional powers Ethiopia and Kenya. Finally, respondents conditioned the 
viability of ongoing intervention in Somalia on political stability inside Turkey. Several 
respondents believed Turkish organisations were prone to unexpected withdrawal from 
Somalia if political changes occurred at home. 
Turkish perceptions of North/Western integrity 
Next, we turn to Turkish perceptions of integrity in the bottom-left quadrant of Figure 1. 
There was virtually no recognition of integrity or shared principles by either side, even when 
provided with opportunities during interviews. However, respondents regularly criticised the 
integrity of counterpart organisations. Turkish government respondents believed that Western 
motivations for intervention were not rooted in Somali poverty but in their home-country’s 
security interests. Several others highlighted the pervasive ‘agenda’ and insincerity of 
Western interveners by contrasting with altruistic Turkish humanitarian action. For example, 
Turkish respondents noted conventional fixations upon security threats and protocols. A 
Turkish NGO representative opined: 
I do not have a bodyguard; we are together with the people on the streets. We do not 
regard them as source of illness or danger. Since our main motive while coming here 
was humanitarian, we make everyone feel that to its last degree…The Western 
organisations have different agendas - coming here with hundreds of body guards and 
showing love to children as the cameras record do not help. 
Relatedly, another Turkish NGO leader argued that humanitarian and development aid’s 
cohabitation with the ongoing AMISON military mission is problematic and viewed Western 
interventionism as an extension of Europe’s historical colonial interference in Somalia. 
 Another critique of North/Western integrity pointed out the apparent dissonance 
between local expectations and conventional intervention structures and processes. For 
example, Turkish respondents were concerned about Western conceptions of statebuilding 
and democratisation. Government respondents argued that Western statebuilding is 
unnecessarily fascinated with and constrained by narrow conceptions of democracy-building 
and human rights promotion. A few respondents noted that Western fixation upon ‘soft’ 
issues such as gender rights was diverting resources and attention from more ‘important’ 
issues such as economic and infrastructure development. This perceived incongruence is 
exaggerated by cultural differences, contrasting religious beliefs, and remote approaches to 
project management that prevent trust-building through face-time with local populations. 
North/Western perceptions of Turkish integrity 
Last, conventional respondents critiqued the underlying motivations for Turkish assistance 
and illustrated several areas of dissonance with ‘acceptable’ intervention norms (bottom-right 
quadrant of Figure 1). Several respondents viewed Turkish intervention in Somalia as an 
important component to the global expansion of self-interested Turkish foreign influence. 
Several respondents including a donor official believed humanitarian assistance allowed the 
Turkish government and business community to penetrate more deeply into Somalia to 
satisfy commercial interests such as exploiting gas and oil resources, and support investments 
in the Mogadishu airport and seaport. 
 Conventional respondents also argued that Turkish organisations transgressed 
‘globally’ accepted principles of humanitarian intervention. For example, a UN official 
shared that her organisation endured reduced legitimacy, latitude and security through 
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association with Turkish organisations since, in some cases, Turkish aid was delivered under 
provocative armed government escorts. In a related example, an NGO official argued that 
Turkish economic development was comparatively inattentive to liberal statebuilding goals. 
Underneath this critique is the perception that Turkish intervention is politicised and 
ambivalent to government corruption.  A donor official shared: 
If we are sending strong messages, trying to address a lack of transparency and 
corruption in government, for example, we will insist that it has to be addressed 
before we can provide more aid. It is undermined by Turkish approaches when they 
go in and fund despite what the government is doing. 
Some respondents believed this negligence has allowed Turkey to reduce the conditionality 
of its aid, which limits its leverage to coerce desired political reforms and undermines 
conventional efforts towards the same. 
As a final critique of integrity, Turkish humanitarian and development decisions were 
perceived to be partially based upon cultural and religious affinities with local populations - 
in contrast to North/Western actors. An NGO official reasoned, ‘Turkey is predominantly a 
Muslim country, and this is an advantage for Turkey.’ Another humanitarian leader claimed 
that religious affinity allowed and required Turkish actors to expand their influence beyond 
the conventional - funding the restoration of mosques, facilitating imam exchanges to Turkey, 
and working closely with Turkey’s Ministry of Islamic Affairs to issue scholarships for 
Somali students to study religion in Turkey.65 
Discussion - Two arenas of contestation in Somalia 
We now explore our original lines of inquiry according to two thematic arenas of contestation 
in our presentation of findings: the status quo hierarchy of global governance and the prevailing 
politics of securitization in Somalia. 
Contending and protecting the hierarchy of global governance 
Our findings reveal a first arena of contestation – respondents perceived Turkish 
organisations to be challenging the status quo hierarchy of global governance and promotion 
of global intervention norms as experienced inside the intervention in Somalia. We need to 
temper this claim somewhat - it is inaccurate to claim a comprehensive rejection of 
conventional North/Western intervention methodologies by Turkish organisations since 
modes of Turkish intervention sometimes look quite similar. However, prevailing 
North/Western approaches are, perhaps, facing an important, albeit limited, challenge from 
Turkish organizations. We initiated this research with unclarity about whether Turkish 
organisations recognise this challenge. Given our Turkish respondents’ explicit structural 
critiques regarding the ability of conventional intervention actors we believe they are at least, 
superficially, aware of their challenge. For example, Turkish respondents regularly reflected 
upon the networked multi-lateral clout and reach of conventional counterparts and, more 
importantly, perceived Turkish organisations to sit outside of this influential network. These 
reflections indicate the perceived exclusiveness of a club of nations who authorise 
membership to some organisations while excluding discordant aspirants such as Turkey. 
Moreover, Turkish critiques of integrity reveal suspicions that the conventional club aspires 
to expand its influence in East Africa in service to homeland self-interests. 
 Turkish interveners also contended the perceived projection of political, social, and 
moral superiority through the implanting of globalised and universalist norms by the 
conventional community.66 Turkish respondents questioned Western integrity and its self-
imposed mission to reform local and national politics and promote human rights along with 
the ‘soft’ transformations it engenders such as gender equality and religious tolerance. 
Turkish scepticism was amplified by their promotion of ‘hard’ economic alternatives - 
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commercial and infrastructure development. But these critiques may be somewhat duplicitous 
– Turkish organisations are also prescriptive as they bypass local structures and viewpoints 
and exploit local commercial opportunities. Similar to other rising powers, Turkey aligns its 
economic investments to its humanitarian and development initiatives, and Turkey has 
consistently insisted that trade is superior to aid for national development.67 
Conversely, conventional actors are protecting the status quo of global governance 
inside Somalia from challenges. Our findings do evidence that conventional representatives 
of the liberal order do feel responsible to monitor emerging actors and do, in fact, distinguish 
between states and organisations who do and do not have the right to intervene, and in what 
manner. Conventional respondents expressed unease about the enticement of Somali politics, 
economics and society towards Turkey, whereby Turkish humanitarian aid serves as an entry 
point for commercial development, resource exploitation, and more profound social 
influence. The protection of global governance was also evident in the way conventional 
interveners downgraded Turkish government influence inside the hierarchy of regional actors 
and their interests in East Africa. Conventional respondents were sceptical of Turkish clout 
and authority, particularly with Ethiopia and Kenya, who contribute numerous troops to the 
ongoing AMISOM mission and are influential actors in political and security reform. This 
concern illustrates how regional relations can overtake local concerns in Somalia to preserve 
global hierarchies and North/Western power. 
Last, conventional interveners were explicitly protective of liberal intervention norms 
– respondents affirmed the moral legitimacy of their mission and utilised the discourse of 
democratisation and human rights to contrast their work with emerging actors.68 For example, 
reflections upon ‘ability’ contained numerous concerns about Turkish transgression of liberal 
standards. Conventional respondents believed coordination processes were essential for 
differentiating between and governing acceptable and non-acceptable intervention practices 
according to ‘universal’ authorised humanitarian principles.69 
Contending and protecting the securitisation and remote control of intervention 
A second arena of contestation is defined by Turkish critiques of the politics of securitisation, 
whereby remote-control humanitarian and development intervention methodologies compel 
expatriate and senior national staff into retreat to secure spaces and behind restricting security 
protocols. Turkish objections centred on the way security risks shaped the design of 
intervention initiatives and the way international project staff avoided local project sites. 
Contention was channelled in two directions. First, Turkish respondents reacted to the logic 
of remote knowledge creation and concomitant decision-making processes that prefer outside 
technical expertise to insider knowledge, which serve to distantiate intervening organisations 
from the priorities of Somalis. Second, respondents described the detrimental effects of 
physical remoteness that has manifestly configured interactions between external interveners 
and local counterparts and populations. Basing operations in Nairobi and parachuting into the 
Mogadishu airport or fortified hotels for meetings have starkly evidenced the conventional 
stance towards a context judged too dangerous for unprotected personal engagement. Further, 
physical remoteness symbolised North/Western agendas, whereby security concerns are 
prioritised despite consequences for humanitarian work, which motivated ideological 
contention by Turkish organisations, who regularly pointed out their everyday proximity to 
project activities. 
Conversely, conventional interveners were unapologetic and somewhat ambivalent 
regarding whether and how their securitised methods might be revised in Somalia. These 
respondents did not admit that alternative manners of intervention are being seriously 
considered even as they recognised the benefits of proximate intervention approaches by 
Turkish organisations. 
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Conclusions 
The bottom line to our research is as follows. Uncooperative and uncoordinated behaviour 
indicates a challenge to North/Western interventionism by Turkish organisations, who appear 
to be (at least minimally) dissonant with the principles and intervention methodologies of the 
conventional humanitarian and development community and are concretizing alternative 
stances with local populations. Concurrently, this struggle indicates the ideological protection 
of ‘approved’ intervention norms by North/Western respondents as they affirmed what they 
perceived to be the boundaries of the conventional intervention project and highlighted 
Turkish transgressions. An original contribution of this research is its problematisation of the 
assumed constructive nature of cooperation and coordination between conventional and 
emerging interveners in conflict zones and suggestion that coordination processes can be 
viewed as sites of co-optation and/or resistance. The struggle to cooperate is not trivial in this 
case but is born of the resistant agency of a challenger to the status quo of intervention 
decision-making. 
Illuminating contestation and protection in the relationship between conventional and 
emerging interveners is significant in two ways. First, our results make new contributions by 
providing empirical support for existing theories of international intervention and global 
governance. What we learn is that the global governance of conflict-zone intervention is not 
impenetrable to challenges from emerging actors and, in response, conventional interveners 
are reflecting upon how coordination processes might coercively guide the dissonant agendas 
of newcomers toward ‘acceptable’ positions. In this case, Turkey has used the good fortune 
of weighty resources and institutional support from the Turkish government to expose the 
conventional project’s efforts to maintain its advantage70 even as they, too, continue to 
operate in service to self-interests. The resulting friction between Turkish contestation and 
conventional defensiveness reveals the potential of and limits to revising the status quo 
hierarchy of global governance and the promotion of less securitised and more proximate 
intervention methodologies. Overall, the empirical illumination of this research is not limited 
to the Somalia case - our insights contribute to a growing understanding of evolving global 
governance with the arrival of new interveners in other conflict-affected humanitarian crises 
across the globe.71 
Our exploration of the potential and limits of inter-organizational coordination and 
cooperation points to a second area of significance. Our lines of inquiry critically inform the 
practices and policies of humanitarian and development organizations by contributing to the 
existing knowledge base that shapes their decision-making. Specifically, our findings feature 
the insight that emerging interveners can apply adequate institutional and resource weight to 
introduce innovative approaches to service-provision despite the coercive influence of more 
powerful partners and their coordination structures. But staying the course with innovative 
methods in the presence of conventional interveners will provoke inter-organizational conflict 
– i.e. the push and pull of contestation and protection. However, the effects of this conflict 
depend on how it is conceptualised. If viewed as transformational in nature,72 dynamics of 
contestation and protection can lead to negotiation, compromise, cross-organizational 
learning and perhaps even some semblance of mutual accountability for meeting the direct 
needs of local populations, civil society and government. 
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